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Africa’s Quest for Long-Term Development:




 The evasive nature which characterizes Africa’s development is something
familiar to all. Various ambitious development strategies, implemented since
the 1970s, have brought little hope for the reversal of Africa’s developmental
malaise. The formulation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development
(NEPAD) in 2001 and its adoption by the African Union (AU) as the
continent’s blueprint policy document for development engendered a lot of
optimism. This optimism resulted partly from the willingness of African
governments to voluntarily undertake what the continent’s development
partners - the G8 - perceived as ‘credible policies’ for resuscitating the ailing
economies of the continent, and partly from the promise of assistance in the
form of accruing  ADE and IDE, debt forgiveness and access to western
markets. There is a growing consensus among development experts that the
provision of such opportunities would alleviate many of the structural
constraints in Africa, consequently catalyzing long-term development. While
NEPAD’s emphasis on promoting peace, security, democracy, and good
governance is commendable, it is however argued that its propensity to gear
development solely along neo-liberal lines is problematic in a continent that
is grappling with the disappointments of the market-based structural
adjustment programmes (SAP).
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The paper advocates the adoption of viable regional integration schemes
that nurture Africa’s fragile industries, diversify its predominantly primary
production-based economies, promote self-reliance and minimise dependence
on external agents. This, it is argued, is a better framework for Africa’s long-
term development.
Resumé
Le caractère évasif dont le développement fait l’objet en Afrique est quelque
chose de familier. Bon nombre de stratégies de développement ambitieuses
mises en œuvre depuis les années 1970 n’ont donné que très peu d’espoir de
juguler le malaise développemental dans lequel l’Afrique se trouve.
L’élaboration, en 2001, du Nouveau Partenariat pour le Développement de
l’Afrique (NEPAD) ainsi que son adoption par l’Union africaine (UA) en
tant que schéma directeur continental pour le développement avaient permis
d’être optimiste. Cet optimisme était dû, d’une part, à la volonté des
gouvernements africains d’adopter délibérément ce que les partenaires au
développement du continent – le G8 – considéraient comme étant des
‘politiques crédibles’ pour ressusciter les économies africaines qui périclitent.
D’autre part, cet optimisme découlait de la promesse d’assistance sous la
forme d’un ODA et FDI accrus, d’une élimination de la dette, et d’accès aux
marchés occidentaux. Les experts en développement s’accordent de plus en
plus sur le fait que la création d’opportunités de cette nature pourrait aider
à lever bon nombre des contraintes structurelles qui existent en Afrique et,
par ricochet, servir de catalyseur pour le développement durable. Même si
l’accent que le NEPAD met sur la promotion de la paix, de la sécurité, de la
démocratie et de la bonne gouvernance est digne d’éloges, d’aucuns
soutiennent que sa tendance à poursuivre les objectifs de développement
seulement à l’aide de moyens relevant du néo-libéralisme pose problème
dans un continent qui se débat encore avec les désillusions causées par les
programmes d’ajustement structurel (PAS) basés sur le marché.
L’article plaide pour l’adoption de plans d’intégration régionale viables
qui consolideraient les industries africaines assez précaires, permettraient
de diversifier les économies principalement caractérisées par les activités du
secteur primaire, favoriseraient l’autosuffisance et minimiseraient la
dépendance à des agents extérieurs. D’aucuns croient que c’est la meilleure
façon d’assurer un développement durable à l’Afrique
Introduction
The formulation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development
(NEPAD) in 2001 and its subsequent adoption by the African Union
(AU) as the continent’s blueprint policy document for development have
excited hopes and optimism. These hopes are justified against a backdrop
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of failures of previous development strategies to reverse Africa’s declin-
ing economic fortunes. This paper examines the capacity of NEPAD and
the AU to generate long-term development. It argues that while the aims
of NEPAD are laudable, its overwhelming thrust to direct Africa’s
development solely along neo-liberal paths is problematic, given the
dismal record of previous neo-liberal development programmes. It opines
further that the starting point for long-term development in Africa is the
promotion of regional and sub-regional integration that mobilises
domestic resources and minimises dependence on the international
market. In placing these and related arguments in context, the paper
highlights the extent of Africa’s developmental crisis, explores the origins
of NEPAD, and revisits the debate on NEPAD’s ability to establish an
auspicious policy framework for African development.
Africa’s Crisis and NEPAD’s Antecedents
Africa’s decadence and negative indicators are all too familiar to be re-
counted in detail. In brief, Africa is the only continent in which living
conditions have been deteriorating in the last thirty years (Guest 2004,
Giddens 1999). Currently between 40 and 60 per cent of its 800 million
people live below the poverty line - earning less than the UN threshold
of $1.00 a day. Africa has high rates of unemployment, illiteracy, mortality
and low rates of per capita incomes, real wages and savings. Malnutrition,
HIV/AIDS and other diseases, along with inadequate health facilities,
have combined to reduce life expectancy in the region. Public access to
modern communication infrastructure such as the internet, telephones
and satellite television is low compared to other regions (UNDP 2004:
183). Africa’s overall economic performance is low, leading to external
borrowing, heavier debt burden and reliance on international aid. In the
midst of such crushing adversities, overseas development assistance
(ODA) and foreign direct investments (FDI) have declined. For example,
Africa’s share of world trade has plummeted from 2.7 per cent in 1990
to just 2 per cent in 2002 (UNCTAD 2004), underscoring its declining
importance and marginalisation in the global economy. The upsurge of
neo-liberal globalisation following the demise of communism in the late
1980s has not helped Africa either. On the contrary, competition and
liberalisation attending globalisation have presented further
developmental challenges to Africa. This, along with the inability of Africa
countries to diversity their economies, has heightened the region’s
vulnerability and uncertainty (Thomson 2000: 168).
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Political conditions in Africa are not better either. Governance is be-
set with corruption, nepotism and neo-patrimonialism, which together
have compounded the continent’s development challenges (Chabal
2002). Human right violations and election rigging are rife notwithstand-
ing the widespread adoption of democratic constitutions. Additionally,
Africa holds the (in)famous accolade as an epicentre of seemingly in-
tractable intra-state conflicts (Adedeji 1999, Laremont 2002). Worse
yet, it has a truncated capacity to manage its environment, increasing its
vulnerability to the devastating effects of famine, droughts and floods.
Guest (2004: 6) perhaps correctly captures this scenario in noting that
‘when the rains fail [Africans] go hungry. And when the rains are too
heavy ... they lose their homes’. By every indication, Africa’s develop-
mental prospects are seriously circumscribed, raising serious doubts about
its ability to meet the UN millennium development goals, including halv-
ing poverty by 2015. Africa, indeed, appears as the ‘hopeless continent’
(Crewe and Aggleton 2003: 142). It is this condition that NEPAD seeks
to reverse. Importantly, NEPAD aims to address Africa’s poverty and
related structural constraints to place the continent firmly on the path to
sustainable development. The formulation of NEPAD could therefore
not have come at a better time and high optimism could not have been
unexpected.
Yet, NEPAD is not the first development programme Africa has fol-
lowed in the quest for development. To be sure, NEPAD’s antecedents
include import substitution industrialisation (ISI), the Lagos Plan of
Action (LPA) formulated in 1980 and structural adjustment programmes.
None of these, however, made meaningful impact on development.
Inspired by the assumptions of the dependency paradigm, attributing
the South’s underdevelopment to the exploitation of capital and the
generally oppressive nature of the international economy, import
substitution was adopted by a number of African countries during the
1960s and 1970s to exert state control over development but also to
minimise dependency on the external global market. Although
subsequently discredited as an explanatory tool, the dependency
approach nonetheless gained popularity in the developing world. In Africa,
import substitution found expression in the proliferation of public
enterprises that dominated nearly all sectors of public life - from
agriculture to infrastructure; from banking to marketing and from
education to transportation (Nellis 1986: 17-20). While such enterprises
temporarily created jobs and theoretically curtailed import bills, they
2. Akcopari.pmd 26/02/2009, 12:3435
36 AJIA 11: 1, 2008
were on the whole a failure. Many enterprises were overstaffed,
underperformed and inefficient. Consequently, they hardly broke even,
let alone made profits and survived on state subsidies. Rather than
spurring development, public enterprises entrenched neo-patrimonial
politics and became avenues for soliciting elite support (Herbst 1990:
38). The inherent inefficiency in public enterprises and the bankruptcy
of ISI as an approach to development became palpable during the
economic recession of the 1970s.
The oil crisis of the 1970s and 1980s and the consequent depression
in the international economic system spawned a dramatic escalation of
Africa’s debt. The crisis caused the predictable retreat of private banks
(the London Club), which had until then been Africa’s main source of
credit. The intervention of the international financial institutions (IFIs)
and bilateral creditors (the Paris Club), from the 1970s signalled the
inexorable demise of ISI as a strategy and statism as an ideology. In
return for credit, the IFIs formulated SAPs as the dominant development
paradigm. Essentially, SAPs embodied a set of neo-liberal and market-
oriented policies, including deregulation, decontrolling, de-subsidisation,
devaluations, downsizing and privatisation. In entrenching the market,
SAPs also redefined and, in fact, confined the state’s role in development
to merely ‘creating an enabling environment’ for the expansion of the
private sector depicted as the engine for growth. In retrospect, policy
prescriptions and restrictions under SAPs were informed by the World
Bank (1981) report, also known as the Berg Report (named after its
principal author, Elliot Berg). In contrast to the underlying assumptions
of ISI, the Berg Report attributed Africa’s crisis to internal causes,
including bad governance, over-bloated bureaucracies, state control of
exchange rates and marketing as well as its generally overextended nature.
Adjustment policies were therefore meant to curb the state’s role by
transferring its power of distribution to the market thereby undermining
its overwhelming control in the economy. The ultimate concern of SAPs
was to resuscitate Africa’s ailing economies and enhance its debt
repayment capacities.
Truncating the traditional role of the state and exciting a mix of
anxieties and uncertainties, SAPs faced initial continental resentment,
part of which was reflected in the formulation of the Lagos Plan of Action.
The LPA was to be an alternative to SAPs whose panoply of obtrusive
conditionalities was perceived as intrusive but also inhibitive to long-
term development. The LPA aimed to engineer development around
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core regional programmes, dominant among which were collective self-
reliance; mobilisation and utilisation of Africa’s resources; and regional
integration. The state was to be the centrepiece of development in this
process (Nyong’o 2002). Together, the LPA’s prescriptions were to
moderate Africa’s precarious dependence on the global market and
mitigate its associated largely negative perennial effects. Yet the laudable
proposals of the LPA never really saw the light of day. Among other
reasons, the LPA lacked implementing structures both at national and
regional levels. Moreover, the LPA more or less came to represent a
loose set of principles and declarations, which never really wielded power
to compel compliance (Shaw 1991, Ikome 2005). Also, weakening the
claims of the LPA was the declining fortunes of socialism, which hitherto
provided an alternative development path, but which was rapidly losing
credence as pro-market reforms were initiated in Russia and Eastern
Europe. Importantly, SAPs showed a stronger capacity to attract much
needed ODA and FDI than did the LPA. At a time of growing
indebtedness and deepening economic crisis, the financial incentives
associated with SAPs proved extraordinarily decisive in the contest with
the LPA for dominance.
SAPs have since the mid-1990s been interjected, in fact augmented,
by new auxiliary programmes designed to facilitate the compliance with
the former’s conditionalities. One of such policies is the highly indebted
poor countries initiative (HIPC). Formulated by the G8 in 1996, the
HIPC scheme identified forty-one countries, thirty-three of which are in
Africa, as poor and needing debt remission. Debt remission was, however,
not unconditional. Prospective beneficiaries were required to have
successfully implemented SAPs for at least six years and should have
been burdened with a debt whose value was more than 250 per cent and
280 per cent of the country’s exports and national revenue respectively.
Countries disqualified by the conditions needed to borrow more and
sink deeper into debt in order to attain the threshold of eligibility
(Akokpari 2001). Although the debt-to-export and revenue ratios were
subsequently reduced to 150 and 250 per cent respectively following
criticisms and outcry from international NGOs, especially Oxfam and
Jubilee 2000, the conditionalities still excluded a good number of African
countries. In the end, debt cancellation under the HIPC became more
rhetorical than real. Only a few African countries, including Uganda,
Ghana and Mozambique, enjoyed partial remission. Five years on, the
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HIPC scheme was eclipsed by the huge euphoria that greeted the for-
mulation of NEPAD.
NEPAD and Africa’s Development: The Debate
NEPAD emerged as an amalgam of three separate development pro-
grammes formulated between 2000 and 2001 in South Africa, Senegal
and in the Ethiopia-based Economic Commission for Africa - ECA
(Ngwane 2002). In South Africa, President Thabo Mbeki developed
the Millennium Partnership for African Recovery (MAP), which aimed
at addressing Africa’s debt and general recovery. MAP enjoyed the support
of Presidents Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria and Olusegun Obasanjo
of Nigeria. Around the same time, the Senegalese President, Abdoulaye
Wade, had formulated the OMEGA Plan, which enjoyed the support of
French African countries, was concerned with building regional
infrastructure and educational projects. The third was the Global Compact
for Africa Recovery (GCAR), initiated by the Economic Commission
for Africa (ECA), based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, through a mandate
from African Ministers of Finance in 2000. The GCAR incorporated the
idea of peer review. Sharing fairly common visions on development, the
three initiatives were merged in July 2001 at the AU Summit in Lusaka,
Zambia, into the New African Initiative (NAI). At the Lusaka summit, a
15-member Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee
(HSGIC), representing all the regions of Africa and chaired by Nigeria,
was appointed to oversee the implementation of the programme. Three
months later, on 23 October 2001, NAI was renamed NEPAD at a meeting
of Heads of States in Abuja.
The objectives of NEPAD were obvious given Africa’s egregious
development challenges. However, a cursory recap of these aims is
essential to place the current analysis in context. Among other things,
NEPAD seeks to eradicate poverty as a prelude to sustainable growth
and development; encourage employment creation; diversify productive
activities to enhance Africa’s international competitiveness; increase
Africa’s access to western markets; and to promote cooperation and
integration in Africa (www.nepad.org). In pursuing these objectives,
NEPAD identified certain key priority areas, including the maintenance
of peace and security through good governance; increased investments
in areas like agriculture, communication, tourism, health and education;
mobilisation of resources to be achieved through increased resource
transfer to Africa via increased ODA, FDI and debt reduction
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(www.nepad.org). These objectives are pursued through the various or-
gans and structures established under NEPAD. The AU is to provide
the overall supervisory direction to ensure synergy between its operations
and that of NEPAD. Thus, with NEPAD, a new development programme
was born, but the critical question is whether it is capable of salvaging
Africa from its despondency and set the stage for long-term development.
This question has provoked profound polemics that features two
diametrically opposed schools of thought - the Afro-optimists and the
Afro-pessimists.
The Afro-optimists
Optimists, composed essentially, but not exclusively of the proponents
of NEPAD, see it as opening a new chapter in African development.
This view presents NEPAD as the hope for turning back the clock of
decay in Africa (Posthumus 2003). Optimism about NEPAD is predicated
on a number of implicit and interrelated assumptions. First, NEPAD
represents a tacit recognition by Africa of the existence of a developmental
crisis and the need to tackle it. By extension, Africa admits that the
origins of its crisis are internal and are linked to insecurity, conflicts and
bad governance. This thinking stands in sharp contrast to earlier positions
depicting Africa’s challenges as externally generated. Consequently, Africa
seeks, in NEPAD, measures that directly address the internal constraints
to development. Proponents of NEPAD argue that the acknowledgement
of the severity of a problem and the preparedness to tackle it is itself a
step towards an ultimate solution.
Furthermore, optimists hold that as a partnership with developed
countries, NEPAD has the ability to attract much needed external aid to
Africa. This expectation is nursed against a background of declining ODA
and FDI to Africa since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the liberation
of Eastern Europe’s economies. For example, in 1992, the OECD pledged
more than $45 billion to the 24 countries in the Eastern European-based
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In that year, the OECD’s
total pledge to Africa with 53 countries was $34 billion (Kraus 1994:
256; Chege 1996: 6; Katsouris 2000: 6-7). Although total ODA to Africa
was $28 billion in 1990, this plummeted to $16.4 billion in 2000 (Asante
2003: 16). Similarly, FDI to Africa has on the aggregate declined, for
example, from $8.1 billion in 1996 to $6.1 billion in 2000. Although
this rose to $13.8 billion in 2001, it fell again to $7 billion in 2003
(Harsch 2003: 16). In general, whereas ODA and FDI to other regions
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of the world increased, those destined for Africa decreased. NEPAD is
expected to fetch Africa $64 billion in aid annually if Africa’s development
partners meet their obligations (The Economist 22 June 2002: 44). Hopes
in NEPAD are thus premised on its promise to increase overseas
investments and aid to Africa over current levels.
Optimism on NEPAD is, moreover, predicated on the expectation of
instigating good governance, whose elusiveness has left damaging
implications for Africa. For example, the absence of good governance
practices has been identified as one of the fundamental causes of Africa’s
stagnation (World Bank 1981). For this reason, even overly critical
observers of NEPAD commend it for recognising the salience of good
governance in development and highlighting its pursuit as a central goal
(Landsberg, 2005). NEPAD’s key instrument for inspiring good
governance is the much heralded African Peer Review Mechanism
(APRM). The APRM is a process to which African states submit to
periodic review to determine their adherence to principles of good
governance set out by the AU during its 2002 July Summit in Durban.
The review is done by a seven-member Independent Panel of Eminent
Persons (IPEP), which conducts countries through various stages of the
review process. The review process, however, is not an end in itself; rather
it is an exercise to judge countries but also to assist them to identify
policy lapses and create the necessary mechanisms to rectify them. The
ultimate goal is to assist governments to improve upon public policies
relating to governance. Submission to the review process is voluntary,
but failure to sign up leaves negative dents on the governance credentials
of countries. Conversely, submitting to the review process serves as a
diplomatic baptism into international creditworthiness.
Although the effectiveness of NEPAD in general and the APRM in
particular to inspire good governance is questioned (Bond 2003, Taylor
2003, Akokpari 2004), it is claimed to at least bring some moral pressure
to bear on countries signing up to it. A favourable governance review
report theoretically increases a country’s chances of benefiting from the
G-8 ‘enhanced partnership’. This includes gaining access to financial aid
and western markets as well as receiving debt remission. By contrast, a
damning report jeopardises a country’s chances of accessing such crucial
development aid. Other incentives for good governance linked, albeit
indirectly, to NEPAD are the African Growth and Opportunity Act
(AGOA) passed by the US government in 2000. AGOA enables 37 of
the 53 African countries to access US markets on meeting liberalisation
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conditionalities. The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) also es-
tablished by Washington in 2003 qualifies eight sub-Saharan countries
to access part of the $5 billion in the account. Qualifications under both
AGOA and MCA are dependent on upholding practices of good
governance. Thus the passing of the APRM test and the consequent
benefits it generates serve as strong incentives for states to aspire to
acceptable governance practices.
The AU/NEPAD drive towards minimising political insecurity through
evolving new security architecture in Africa is another positive agenda
inspiring optimism. The new security architecture is to be driven by sub-
regional organisations and governed by the ‘African solutions to African
problems’ slogan. The focus on sub-regional formations is informed by
a number of interrelated factors, including the retreat of western
governments from direct peacekeeping operations, coupled with the
inability of the nascent AU to deal with Africa’s conflict. The AU/NEPAD
security regime seeks to strengthen the capacities of regional organisations
in conflict containment, management and resolution through maximising
the use of domestic but also external resources. NEPAD has already
served to attract external resources from Africa’s development partners
towards peace and security. For example, having recognised NEPAD as
Africa’s main development framework, the US has supported every UN
resolution on conflict management in the region. Beneath the multilateral
level, Washington has worked directly with regional organisations to
resolve conflicts. It has, for instance, collaborated with the Kenya-based
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to get Sudan’s
warring factions to negotiate peace. Similarly, it has cooperated with the
AU and the UN in resolving the conflict in Darfur.1 As well, it has been
involved in the establishment of the African Crisis Response Initiative
(ACRI) under which close to 9,000 African soldiers were trained for
emergency peacekeeping and peace-enforcing duties on the continent.
ACRI has since been replaced by the Africa Contingency Operations
Training Assistance - ACOTA (Handy 2003).
Britain and France have also developed the African Peacekeeping
Training Support Programme (APTSP) and the Renforcement des
Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP) respectively.
Known collectively as the P-3 Initiatives, these projects are aimed at
enhancing Africa’s capacity in conflict management thereby reducing its
dependence on the West for peacekeeping requirements (Berman and
Sams 1998). The EU and the US have assisted the Economic Community
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of West African States (ECOWAS) logistically in the latter’s peacekeep-
ing operations in the sub-region. For example the UK assisted
ECOWAS’s peace operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone, while France
provided the first armed response to the Ivorian conflict in the face of
fledgling ECOWAS’s diplomatic efforts. Africa’s western partners have
also given assistance to South Africa in its peace initiatives in Burundi
and the DRC. In short, NEPAD provides opportunities for cooperation
between Africa and western countries in strengthening the fragile security
structures on the continent, although it must be noted that these various
assistance efforts have been limited to logistics.
Above all, the AU and NEPAD seek to promote regional integration
whose importance to Africa’s development cannot be overstressed.
Previous approaches, including import substitution and structural
adjustment, have brought unmitigated disappointments to Africa.
Moreover, as Africa stands at the threshold of further marginalisation in
a post-Cold War multipolar world dominated by trading blocs (Gilpin
2000: 302), regional integration is widely seen as the answer to its
underdevelopment and active participation in the global economy
(Adedeji 1976; World Bank 1981). NEPAD’s approach is to strengthen
regional formations and subsequently create an African common market
as envisaged under the 1991 Abuja Treaty. In summarising some of its
positives, Koyi (2002: 55) argues that NEPAD provides an avenue for
Africa to engage and negotiate with the west for a new place in the
international political economy as well as creates opportunities for the
region to take ownership of its development process. Together, these
factors underscore the efficacy of NEPAD and why the programme raises
optimism regarding Africa’s long-term development.
The Afro-pessimists
While NEPAD theoretically promises to set Africa on a development
course, it also imparts contradictions and ambiguities, which together
raise fundamental questions about its ability to meet its stated objectives.
These questions have also become the basis for criticism and pessimism.
Although presented as a programme of partnership, the relationship
between the west and Africa is criticised for lacking the reciprocity,
complementarity or symbiosis that characterise genuine partnerships.
On the contrary, it is a fundamentally skewed partnership reminiscent of
the relationship ‘between a rider and a horse’ (Ngwane 2003: 3), or a
benevolent and a beggar (Orakwue 2002). Accordingly, the NEPAD
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acronym is either often derided as meaning a ‘new partnership for Afri-
ca’s domination or destruction’, or pronounced humorously as ‘KNEE-
PAD’ to depict Africa’s preparedness to stay longer on its knees while
pleading for aid (Orakwue 2002). In fact, Asante (2003: 14) describes
the partnership more succinctly as a ‘partnership of unequal partners’.
These reservations evoke doubts about the genuineness of the partner-
ship between Africa and the G8.
Admittedly, much of these negative comparisons and analogies about
NEPAD derive from the unending suspicions about the programme’s
origins. In contrast to its portrayal as a home-grown project, NEPAD is
frequently seen as a construction of the west (Adesina 2003, Bond 2003:
12, Tamele 2003). This critical view argues that a genuinely formulated
African programme will eschew the neo-liberal prescriptions embodied
in NEPAD, which more or less are the very policies constraining the
region’s development (Govender 2003). Beset with poverty and adversity,
moreover, a truly formulated African development programme would
evolve people-centred and poverty-targeted policies, which are visibly
missing in NEPAD (Giyose 2003). NEPAD presents a neo-liberal
framework, patterned along textbook economics and expected to work
from a classical point of view. But worldwide experience shows that
textbook economics are not written for economies in decline such as
those in Africa, which defy basic neo-classical logic. A neo-liberal
programme centred on the market, informed by the logic of trickle-down
economics and with a plethora of conditionalities such as NEPAD, can
only exacerbate rather than ameliorate poverty and underdevelopment.
If the origins and nature of NEPAD, along with the partnership it
evokes with the west, are suspiciously dubious, the commitment of
Africa’s partners to meet aid obligations is an even bigger source of
pessimism. Africa’s unmitigated past disappointments with western aid
deals substantiate this. In 1986, for example, the UN developed a four-
year recovery programme, the United Nations Programme of Action for
African Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PARRED) 1986-
1990. This programme embodied pledges by the international creditor
community to provide assistance to Africa. However, the tepid response
from the international community condemned UN-PARRED to a
premature demise. Again, in 1991, the United Nations New Agenda for
the Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF) was adopted
under which the international creditor community was to commit 0.7
percent of its GNP as ODA to Africa. On their part, African countries
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committed themselves to economic and democratic reforms. However,
in return for Africa’s wholesale adoption of SAPs and submission to
multiparty elections by the close of the decade, only the Netherlands,
and the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway and Sweden
provided 0.7% or higher of their GNP as ODA to Africa. In fact, aggregate
ODA to Africa actually plummeted from $28.6 billion in 1990 to $16.4
billion in 2000 (Bentsi-Enchill 1997; Asante 2003: 16). Here, too, donor
pledges went unfulfilled.
Similarly, as noted already, the HIPC programme initiated in 1996
brought little debt relief to the region. Africa’s latest disappointment
came from Gleneagles, Scotland, where the G8 met in July 2005. The
AU had expected a massive increment in aid, unconditional debt
cancellation and bigger access to western markets given public declarations
of the G8, in particular the US and UK, to help Africa out of its quagmires.
However, at the conclusion of the meeting, the G8 only adjusted aid
figures from the current $25 billion a year to $50 billion by 2010. Experts
estimate that Africa requires $100 billion in development aid and a
minimum annual growth rate of seven percent (more than double the
current growth rate of between two and three percent) if it is to meet the
UN millennium goals (Short 2002). Moreover, of the 18 countries which
received some debt cancellation, only 14 were African in contrast to the
AU’s expectation of total and unconditional remission of the region’s
debt. As well, little was achieved by way of increasing Africa’s access to
western markets. Indeed, Africa has a limited ability to compete in
western markets where agriculture and other industries are heavily
subsidised even if granted unfettered access (Keet 2002). The
intermittent trade wars between the EU and the US; Japan and the US;
the US and the Caribbean over banana exports; and the ongoing EU
disagreements with China over the latter’s textiles exports to the former
highlight the mercantilist tendencies of western countries. Despite
professions to extroversion and market fundamentals, western common
markets are innately protectionist (Rugman 2001: 10) and loathe to
implement trade policies that are potentially injurious to their industries.
Accordingly, there is little evidence to suggest that meeting donor
conditionalities under NEPAD will necessarily attract ODA and FDI.
As noted earlier, NEPAD’s acclaimed potential to promote good
governance, through the innovative APRM, is another source of optimism.
However, this optimism is misplaced for at least two reasons: First, as
indicated already, submission to the APRM is voluntary. Countries which
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initially signed up can opt out if the process proves intrusive. Second,
and more important, the AU lacks the muscle to compel countries to
either sign up to the review process or to comply with standards of good
governance. This is a major limitation that has left the AU and APRM
as a lame leviathan. Four countries - Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius and
Rwanda - were reviewed in 2004. However, consistent with the APRM’s
lack of compulsion, the review process focussed not on whether the stated
standards of governance were adhered to, but whether the countries
‘[were] moving towards these goals’ (Africa Research Bulletin, 2004:
15629-30). The incapacity of NEPAD and the AU to generate good
governance is also evident in continuous allegations of corruption and
nepotism involving top government officials in Africa, and grotesque
human right restrictions and abuses in Zimbabwe and Swaziland nearly
four years after the adoption of NEPAD and the APRM. Nor have
NEPAD and the AU been able to completely stem conflicts and wars in
Africa. On the contrary, in spite of successes in ending conflicts in Angola
and Mozambique, others have continued to rage. Darfur, Somalia and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) continue to present
challenges to the AU, while peace in the Ivory Coast, Liberia and Sudan
remain fragile at best. Other disturbing internal tensions such as in
Zimbabwe continue to test the ability of the AU to restore sound
governance practices on the continent.
Also, the threat of military intrusion into politics has not completely
abated in spite of the AU’s declared disdain for unconstitutional changes
of governments. Although a military coup was averted in Equatorial
Guinea in May 2004, one did occur in Mauritania in August 2005. And
while they are commended for championing a new peace and security
architecture, the AU and NEPAD impart an ambiguous, often
contradictory, stance on some aspects of conflict management. The AU
failed to stop the repeated military aggression of Rwanda against the
DRC as well as deal with blatant instances of stage-managed elections
such as occurred in Togo in May 2005 (Klingebiel 2005: 41) which hold
critical implications for stability and security. Election results have
continued to be contested, highlighting the fragility of democracy. These
lapses and sources of tension are not only an indictment on the AU, but
also question the ability of NEPAD to deliver good governance.
The overwhelming neo-liberal orientation of NEPAD is a further
source of concern. But this posture is informed not only by the global
dominance of neo-liberalism as an ideology, but importantly by the
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assumption tracing Africa’s crisis to mainly internal factors. This belief
constitutes the core beliefs of the IFI on Africa and explains the persistence
of the former in prescribing irresistibly neo-liberal and market-based
solutions. Yet, the generally pauperising effects of SAPs, but also the
preponderance of economic crisis, deflates optimism about NEPAD. In
West Africa, for example, where economic decline and impoverishment
have been massive, NEPAD is either unknown, considered an exclusively
South African agenda, or a personal Mbeki project. Similarly, Osei-
Hwedie (2003) has noted that having just emerged from war, Angola
has become more preoccupied with internal reconstruction and
development than with NEPAD. The trajectory of debt and economic
decline has rendered countries introverted and largely concerned with
finding solutions to internal economic problems. Countries are
extroverted only towards potential sources of assistance such as the west.
Agyeman-Duah and Daddieh’s (1994) contention that Africa’s foreign
policies, particularly towards western countries, are aimed principally at
soliciting external assistance, is as valid today under NEPAD as it was
over a decade ago under SAPs. Thus failing to generate tangible relief in
a region facing massive socioeconomic adversities, NEPAD is hardly a
credible programme for long-term development.
Africa’s Hope: Pragmatism Beyond Rhetoric
In the face of repeated unfulfilled western promises and the inability of
previous strategies to induce development, Africa’s hopes lie in a
development model that minimises dependence on external agencies. I
surmise that this model is to be found in regional integration. There are
compelling reasons for regionalism in Africa. Among other reasons, Africa
is threatened with further marginalisation in the global economy; it has
fragmented populations with only five of the 53 countries on the
continent having a population of more than 30 million and over a quarter
with a population of less than three million. Integration creates bigger
markets and stimulates large scale production (Nyong’o 1990: 12). This
in turn mitigates Africa’s dependence on the world economy, its status
as a supplier of raw materials and an importer of manufactured goods
(Asante 2007: 29). In addition, regionalism insulates Africa’s nascent
industries against international competition. For these and related reasons
regional integration is an imperative. Integration holds the key to
unlocking the door to Africa’s development. The AU rightly recognises
this necessity and presents regional integration as a cardinal objective of
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NEPAD. However, the AU’s call for regional integration has not been
accompanied by clear specifications regarding the form of regionalism
envisaged for the continent.
The fragility of Africa’s economies and its increasing marginality in
the international political economy necessitate a regionalist approach
that elevates Africa and augments its capacity as an active (as opposed
to a marginal) participant in the global economy without aggravating its
external dependence. Indeed, Africa requires a special form of integration.
It is generally acknowledged that the abatement of the Cold War has
ushered in a second wave of regionalism aptly described as the ‘new’
regionalism. This is contrasted with the first wave or ‘old’ regionalism,
which dominated the integration discourse and practice between the
1950s and 1980s (Lee 2003: 28). Informed by Cold War politics and
dominated by the state, the old regionalism was concerned with the
economic and political security of states (Hettne 1999; De Melo and
Panagriya 1992: 1; Wyatt-Walter 2000: 79-80; Gilpin 2000: 58). The
new regionalism, in contrast, pursues objectives that transcend the narrow
confines of ideology and security to include a holistic definition of
development that includes environmental protection, human security and
regional self-sufficiency, among other things. Moreover, in contrast to
the old, the new approach to regionalism recognises the critical importance
of non-state actors, including informal sectors in the regional integration
process.
Yet, in unpacking the new regionalism, at least four competing forms
are discernible, including (i) open regionalism, (ii) the WIDER approach,2
(iii) regionalism from below, and, (iv) the external guarantors’ model.
Some of the key assumptions of these are briefly summarised here. Open
regionalism is informed by neo-classical assumptions. It presents the
market as the key driving force of integration. Consequently, it calls for
the dismantling of trade barriers and making states more extroverted. In
this regard, open regionalism is consistent with neo-liberal globalisation
as it facilitates the incorporation of states into the wider global trading
system (Soderbaum 1996: 1-2). By its assumptions, open regionalism
with its intrinsic neo-liberal agenda imparts damaging implications for
integration in Africa. The imposition of the market-led SAPs in the 1980s
was an attempt to make African states more outward looking at the
expense of promoting intra-regional trade. Lee (2003: 32) argues that
the free trade policies followed in the 1980s under SAPs cost African
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countries much revenue and generated further economic crisis. She ar-
gues further that:
during the [1980s] the IMF and World Bank explicitly discouraged
market integration because it was seen as being counterproductive to
the neo-liberal orthodoxy that enhanced the power of the capitalist
core to have unlimited ability to export to the African periphery in
the name of efficiency and competition (Lee 2003: 32).
By promoting engagement with the international system, open
regionalism has a tendency to perpetuate the skewed and already
disconcerting international division of labour under which Africa is
encouraged to augment its capacity to produce primary agricultural raw
materials and minerals while severely truncating its options towards
industrialisation. In conforming to the neo-liberal inclinations, therefore,
NEPAD is explicitly opting for open regionalism.
The WIDER approach sees the new regionalism as a multidimensional
process that leads to the homogenisation of political, social, cultural and
economic policies of states (Soderbaum 1996: 1-2). It proceeds on the
premise that globalisation and regionalisation are part of a process of
structural change occurring at the global level (Hettne 1999: 2). WIDER
sees globalisation as a force escalating ‘market-driven disorder and
turbulence not only on the level of the world but also in local systems’
(Hettne et al., 1999: xxxi). As a prescription for this ‘disorder’ the WIDER
approach promotes regionalism from below rather than the state-led
approach often initiated from the top. Thus, regionalism is seen as a
process by states to increase regional trade and interdependence to serve
as a counter-hegemonic force to globalisation (Hettne 1999: 6). In this
sense, regionalism offers a path for marginalised regions in Africa, Latin
America and in the Arab world to establish large integrated regions that
create a new and different global world from the globalisation-generated
‘global disorder’ of the post-Cold War era (Amin 1999: 54, 62). The
prescriptions of the LPA in 1980 calling for collective self-reliance through
the mobilisation of regional resources, and curbing reliance on the global
market, are consistent with the WIDER approach to integration and
development.
Like WIDER, regionalism from below, (also referred to as ‘new
regionalism’) sees regional integration as a counter-force to globalisation.
It presents regionalism as a process driven not only by states but also by
non-state actors, including informal sectors such as cross border trading
activities (Marchand et al., 1999: 900). Globalisation produces winners
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and losers with the latter in the majority. Marginalised in the mainstream
of economic activity, losers under globalisation retreated into the informal
sector. Regionalism from below acknowledges the phenomenal expansion
of the informal sector on account of the failure of the state to meet
popular expectations. It therefore calls on developing countries to shun
the state-dominated European Union model of integration in favour of
non-state approaches to regionalism. Accordingly, regionalism from below
incorporates non-state actors and strengthens regional networks in formal
and informal trade (Lee 2003: 37). Further it seeks to utilise the
opportunities, creativity and innovations of the second economy in the
regionalism project. Given the growing size of the informal sector, this
version of regionalism is recommended for Africa. With the rapid
displacement and replacement of the state by the market under the
globalisation-liberalisation regime as the mover of development, and
with the former’s truncated ability to deliver basic social services, the
informal sector is set to become an important agent in Africa’s
development.
The ‘external guarantor’s model’, (EGM) advocates a partnership
between developed and developing countries in establishing regional
integration schemes in the latter. It argues that international agencies
such the World Bank, IMF, and creditor countries should have greater
influence on Africa’s regionalism by acting as guarantors to prevent the
reversal of politically unpopular microeconomic programmes (Helleiner
1999: 118). The EGM is reminiscent of France’s role in the French West
African Monetary Union, l’Union économique et monétaire ouest-
africaine (UEMOA). In this union, the common currency of the UEMOA,
the CFA, is linked to the French franc with Paris serving as the guarantor
and supervisor. NEPAD seeks to establish a similar supervisory role for
Africa’s creditors who, in addition to ensuring compliance with
conditionalities, also ensure the judicious use of disbursed credit. The
immediate implications of this are obvious. The EGM holds mixed
blessings for Africa. Whereas it could instigate good governance practices,
it could also - as with the experiences with SAPs - potentially entail
intrusive and pauperising conditionalities that could worsen Africa’s
development challenges.
At a critical juncture in its development experience, Africa requires
regionalism that combines the best possible opportunities for accelerated
development. As Keet (2002: 38) rightly argues, Africa requires ‘rounded
internally integrated and more soundly-based production economics’.
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To this end, Africa should de-emphasise the open regionalism intrinsic
in NEPAD. As noted earlier, open regionalism is extroverted and fosters
greater incorporation of states into the capitalist economy, something
that has, at least with the experience with SAPs, not helped the course
of African development. Moreover, open regionalism creates little
opportunities for diversifying the narrow and agricultural-based
economies of Africa. Nor is the external guarantor’s model of integration
good for Africa. With conditionalities, the active involvement of neo-
liberal institutions and actors would certainly incline Africa towards open
regionalism. A more development-friendlier form of regionalism is that
which combines elements of the WIDER approach and regionalism from
below. These are predominantly introverted approaches to regionalism
that mobilise domestic resources, recognise the importance of the huge
and expanding informal sector, and above all fit formal and informal
structures into the development effort. While recognising the salience
and complementary role of external aid, these approaches place emphasis
on collective self-reliance. Such approaches to regionalism offer better
policy frameworks for long term integration and development. Excessive
dependence on the international system as prescribed by open regionalism
is inimical to long term development in Africa.
Conclusion
NEPAD has been hailed by its proponents for giving Africa a lifeline for
development. This view is advanced against a background of the failure
of past approaches to salvage the continent. Optimism for development
is also premised on a set of logical assumptions about NEPAD, including
its potential to attract aid and investment; to instigate good governance;
to address Africa’s perennial conflicts through a new security architecture;
and its drive to promote regional integration. However, the paper has
demonstrated the limits of these arguments. It noted among other things
that NEPAD fails to address poverty, one of Africa’s most daunting
challenges. Also, its heavy reliance on external agencies truncates its
ability to generate development given the west’s appalling record of
meeting aid obligations to Africa. In addition, there is no certainty about
NEPAD’s ability to instigate good governance through the APRM. The
APRM is a voluntary process devoid of any real mechanisms to compel
compliance with good governance practices. These and other inherent
limitations of NEPAD rob it of a genuine claim to be a framework for
Africa’s long term development.
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The importance of regional integration in Africa was emphasised,
against a background of its balkanisation, vulnerability to further
marginalisation in the world economy, and the need to insulate its nascent
industries against international competition. Africa requires a
development agenda that captures the objective exigencies of the region.
Regionalism provides the framework for evolving such a programme.
Yet, while acknowledging the importance of regionalism, Africa requires
considerable caution in embracing the new wave of integration. To be
sure, the new regionalism embodies various versions some of which can
potentially thwart Africa’s development. Open regionalism and the
external guarantor’s models, for example, are not the options for Africa
as these imply a stronger incorporation of Africa into the global economy.
Whereas a complete de-linkage from the global economy as advocated
by the dependency paradigm in the 1970s is preposterous, Africa requires
a regionalist approach that seeks to nature fragile industries, diversify
its predominantly agricultural economies, promote self-reliance and
minimise dependence on external agents. Combined elements of the
WIDER approach and regionalism from below can establish this
framework.
Notes
1. The US single-handedly provided financial support in the neighbourhood of
$300 million towards humanitarian efforts in Darfur and has assisted in
airlifting Rwanda and Nigerian monitors to the region.
2. WIDER is the acronym for the World Institute for Development and
Economic Research of the UN University in Helsinki, Norway. The Institute
undertook studies on integration in the early 1990s to understand the
dynamics of the new wave of regionalism after the Cold War. In contrast to
classical integration theory the WIDER study sought to examine the role of
economic, social, cultural and political issues in the integration process. Out
of this seminal study emerged a set of assumptions and prescriptions that
came to be referred to as the WIDER approach.
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